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Court in Aiken relied on precedents which legislation would
effectively overrule7 to reach a decision contrary to the traditional
policy of expansive copyright protection of the performance right.
Donna L. Seidel
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTION-STANDING TO
CHALLENGE RESTRICTIVE ZONING ORDINANCES-The Supreme Court of
the United States has held that minority nonresidents lack standing
to attack a town zoning ordinance where they cannot show that but
for the ordinance they could have obtained affordable housing, or
that if granted relief they would benefit.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
The zoning ordinance of the town of Penfield, a suburb of Roches-
ter, New York, allocated ninety-eight percent of its vacant land to
single-family detached dwellings and contained minimum lot size,
set back, floor area and habitable space requirements which were
allegedly unreasonable. Petitioners sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief and damages, maintaining that this ordinance, coupled
with the refusals of Penfield's Zoning, Planning and Town Boards
to grant variances, resulted in an almost total absence of affordable
housing for low and moderate income minority persons.
The original plaintiffs were nonresident minority persons with low
or moderate incomes, individual taxpayers of Rochester, and Metro-
Act, a nonprofit association promoting improved low and moderate
income housing in the Rochester area whose membership included
Penfield residents. Rochester Home Builders (Home Builders), rep-
resenting area construction firms, and the Housing Council in the
Monroe County Area, Inc. (Housing Council) unsuccessfully at-
lived novelty, Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1947 so that the reproduction or
rendition of a copyrighted musical composition on a coin-operated machine would not consti-
tute a public performance for profit unless a fee were charged for admission to the place where
the performance occurred. Under the revised copyright law, the proprietor of an establish-
ment who operates such a phonorecord player is liable for infringement unless he obtains a
license to perform the work publicly.
71. Passage of the copyright revision legislation, which expressly treats CATV as public




tempted to be joined as party plaintiffs. The complaint was dis-
missed by the district court on the ground, inter alia, that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing to sue;' the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed.' Petition for certiorari was granted.3 The Supreme
Court held that none of the petitioners alleged facts sufficient to
satisfy either the article III standing requirement or the judicially
imposed prudential limitations.4
Before examining the issues, Justice Powell, writing for the major-
ity, summarized the applicable standing principles. In determining
whether a plaintiff is entitled to receive judicial consideration of his
case on its merits, the court must take into account both constitu-
tional and prudential limitations.' The plaintiff must allege a case
or controversy within the accepted meaning of article III of the
Constitution. He must allege that he is threatened with or has suf-
fered an actual personal injury as a result of the defendant's puta-
tively illegal action.' The prudential limitations are self-imposed to
avoid litigation involving "abstract questions of wide public signifi-
cance" which might better be dealt with by another governmental
branch.7 Thus when the plaintiff's injury is shared by a large class
of persons or was indirectly caused by the defendant's actions to-
ward a third party, standing may be denied.8 An examination of the
claim's source could determine that the plaintiff has a right to relief
in spite of a prudential limitation. Congress may specifically grant
a right of action to those who would otherwise be foreclosed. Addi-
tionally, when the claim is based on third party rights, the court
might imply a right of action when there are strong countervailing
circumstances which outweigh prudential concerns.' In every case,
the constitutional requirement of a distinct, palpable injury to the
plaintiff must be satisfied.
1. Warth v. Seldin, Civil No. 73-2024 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 1972). The court also held that
petitioners failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the suit could
not proceed as a class action.
2. Warth v. Seldin, 495 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1974).
3. Warth v. Seldin, 419 U.S. 823 (1974).
4. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
5. Id. at 498. The Court cited Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953) (Court has
developed a complementary rule of self-restraint in addition to the jurisdictional require-
ment).
6. 422 U.S. at 499, citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973). See note 49
and accompanying text infra.
7. 422 U.S. at 500.
8. Id. at 499.
9. Id. at 500-01.
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Four individual petitioners alleged that they were residents of
Rochester with low or moderate incomes who desired to reside in
Penfield. 0 They claimed Penfield's zoning ordinance, on its face and
as enforced, violated their civil rights by effectively prohibiting con-
struction of affordable housing for persons of their financial class,
which included the majority of racial and ethnic minorities." Ac-
cordingly, these petitioners asserted standing to challenge the re-
spondents' allegedly discriminatory practice. The majority stated
that the constitutional standing requirement necessitated an allega-
tion of facts from which it might reasonably be inferred that absent
the restrictive zoning practice there would have been a substantial
probability either that these low income petitioners could have ob-
tained affordable housing, or that if granted relief they would bene-
fit. 2 The proposed housing projects which were barred and similar
projects which might be built should relief be granted were too
expensive to satisfy petitioners' needs. 3 Hence the facts alleged
were insufficient to demonstrate an actionable causal relationship
between respondents' actions and petitioners' asserted injuries."
The taxpayers' alleged injury was strictly economic. They argued
that Penfield's ordinance forced low and moderate income persons
to reside in Rochester, where tax abatements on housing necessary
to accommodate these persons resulted in an increase in property
taxes required to support municipal services. The majority held the
line of causation was too attenuated, and noted that even had it
been sufficient, the claim would still fail since it was based on the
rights of the low income petitioners."
Metro-Act claimed standing on the basis of injury to its members,
who included low and moderate income persons, Rochester taxpay-
ers and residents of Penfield. The Court felt this group's reliance on
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co." was inapposite.
10. Petitioners desired better housing conditions, recreational and educational opportuni-
ties, police protection and easier access to jobs. Id. at 524 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
majority observed that, if proved, the exclusion alone would constitute a sufficient injury for
standing purposes. Id. at 503 & n.13.
11. All of the petitioners generally invoked the first, ninth and fourteenth amendments,
and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1970). 422 U.S. at 493.
12. 422 U.S. at 504.
13. Id. at 506. For the majority's analysis of the specific facts see id. at 505-07 nn.15 &
16.
14. Id. at 507.
15. Id. at 509.
16. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
Vol. 14: 750
Recent Decisions
The Trafficante plaintiffs, residents of a housing complex whose
landlord discriminated against non-whites, claimed they were de-
nied the benefits of living in a racially integrated environment. The
majority in Warth'emphasized that those plaintiffs were successful
because their claim was based on § 804 of the Civil Rights Act of
1968,17 which created a right of action for an injury which would
otherwise not be judicially cognizable. I" Warth was distinguishable,
since Metro-Act did not invoke this statute. 9
Home Builders sought prospective relief and damages for its
member construction firms allegedly deprived of substantial busi-
ness opportunities and profits. Standing was denied as to the claim
for damages. Since the damages alleged were peculiar to each firm
and could not be generalized, Home Builders was not a proper repre-
sentative of the members' claims. The claim for prospective relief
failed due to the nonexistence of a controversy of sufficient immedi-
acy or ripeness, since no member firm had recently been denied the
opportunity to build in Penfield. Housing Council's claim was pre-
cluded for the same reason.2"
None of the Justices upheld the taxpayers' position.2' Justice
17. This section provides that it shall be unlawful:
(a) To refuse to. . . negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale
or rental of a dwelling . . . because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3604 (Supp. V, 1975).
18. 422 U.S. at 513-14. See 409 U.S. at 212 (White, J., concurring). The majority's state-
ment of Trafficante is somewhat misleading. In Trafficante, the issue was whether the resi-
dents of a housing complex who claimed to be injured by the exclusion of non-whites could
properly assert a § 3604 injury. A broad interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970), a "person
aggrieved" enforcement provision, enabled the Court to grant standing. This was a "zone of
interests" case. See note 47 and accompanying text infra. The Court did not indicate the
result had the Warth action been brought under § 804. 422 U.S. at 513 & n.21.
19. Metro-Act argued that Trafficante's real significance was its holding that allegations
of denial of important benefits from interracial associations satisfied the article III "injury
in fact" requirement. Petitioner's Brief at 40-41, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Metro-
Act maintained that such an injury fell within the zone of interests protected by the first
amendment. Id. at 42.
The Penfield residents had claimed their first amendment right of association had been
violated, but the majority did not address this argument. The Court observed that even if
the injury to the Penfield residents satisfied constitutional requirements, the injury was
"indirect" since it resulted from the exclusion of a third party. Hence the claim would be
foreclosed by the appropriate prudential limitation. 422 U.S. at 514.
20. See 422 U.S. at 514-17.
21. The majority flatly denied the taxpayers standing. Justice Douglas did not discuss the
taxpayers' claim. Justice Brennan did not consider the claims of either the taxpayers or
1976
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Douglas would have granted standing to Housing Council and
Metro-Act, since in his opinion both represented the "communal
feeling."" Justice Brennan would have found favorably for Housing
Council, the low income petitioners and Home Builders. He felt the
majority's rationale deprived the low income petitioners of their day
in court by requiring them to actually prove their case beforehand."3
Further, where a pattern-and-practice claim such as that made out
by Housing Council and Home Builders was asserted, it was unreal-
istic to focus on a particular project. The existence of past injury
and the intent to build if the barrier was removed were a sufficient
basis for standing."
In 1970, the Court, in Association of Data Processing Service Or-
ganizations v. Camp,'5 created a two-part standing test. The plain-
tiff must allege an "injury in fact"" to an interest which arguably
lies within the zone of interests to be protected by the constitutional
or statutory provision in question.27 The significance of the Data
Processing test is readily apparent when compared with previous
standing doctrine. Prior to 1968, one who claimed standing to sue
in a federal court had to demonstrate that his "legal interests" had
been violated. These interests might stem from common law rights,
statutes or constitutional provisions. 8 An inherent difficulty with
Metro-Act, since in his opinion the other petitioners had standing. Id. at 521 n.2 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The dissenters characterized the majority as
"antagonistic" and indefensibly hostile. Id. at 519, 520. Justice Douglas observed that a desire
to limit federal court caseloads was an invalid justification for denying access to the courts,
particularly in cases involving racial discrimination. Id. at 519.
23. Id. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also chastised the majority for
purposely avoiding a decision on the merits from fear of the sociological and political conse-
quences. Id. at 520.
24. Id. at 530.
25. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
26. Id. at 152. This was a reiteration of the article III "case or controversy" requirement,
aimed at insuring that the plaintiff possessed a sufficient personal interest in the litigation.
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970). As explained in Data Processing, the injury could
be-noneconomic as well as economic in nature. 397 U.S. at 154.
27. 397 U.S. at 155.
28. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940); Tennessee Elec.
Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939). But see Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,
316 U.S. 4 (1942) (plaintiffs as representatives of the public interest); FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) (although Communications Act did not protect a radio
station from competitive injury, Congress intended standing for those in plaintiffs position
that they might serve as a check on the Commission's power).
The above cases are discussed in Scott, Standing-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV.
Vol. 14: 750
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this approach was evident where a plaintiff's claim rested on a
statute which, like a constitutional provision, had no enforcement
mechanism. To determine whether the statute granted the plaintiff
a right of action, the courts looked for guidance to the circumstances
surrounding the case. Prime focal points were the directness of the
injury and the size of the group suffering the injury.29 Such inquiries
could lead to a consideration of the merits of the case, which theo-
retically should have no impact on the standing issue. 0
In 1962 the Court had enunciated in Baker v. Carr3 an extremely
flexible test, which has survived with varying interpretations: The
person claiming standing must have a "personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy."32 This touchstone of the standing doctrine
was rendered somewhat more concrete through application in Flast
v. Cohen.33 The plaintiff, a federal taxpayer, challenged the expend-
iture of federal funds for what he alleged was an unconstitutional
purpose. The Court held that for the plaintiff to have a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy there must be a "logical
nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adju-
dicated. ' 34 As applied in Flast, this test provided federal taxpayers
645 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Scott]. Professor Scott analyzes the evolution of the standing
doctrine by classifying cases as involving either statutory or non-statutory review. Claims
founded upon a statute which expressly provides for judicial review fall in the former cate-
gory; those based on statutes without such provisions or on constitutional provisions fall
within the latter. Sanders, according to Scott, is an example of the more liberal standing
which the Court has been willing to give in statutory review cases. Id. at 656. See K. DAVIs,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 22.01 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as DAVIs].
29. Scott, supra note 28, at 651-54. By his analysis of the standing decisions in the "legal
interest" era, Scott concludes that the Court considered such factors when exercising its
discretion to grant standing in non-statutory review cases. Using the Court's terminology,
these factors are prudential limitations on the exercise of its jurisdiction. See Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166 (1974); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1943) (dealing with generalized grievances).
See also United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953);
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (concerning third party rights). These cases were cited
by the Warth majority. 422 U.S. at 499-500. See generally Sedler, Standing to Assert Consti-
tutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Sedler].
30. Scott, supra note 28, at 654. See 422 U.S. at 500.
31. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
32. Id. at 204. For a repudiation of this approach to the standing question see DAvis, supra
note 28, at § 22.04; Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450, 470
(1970).
33. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
34. Id. at 102.
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with standing in limited situations. 5 Both Baker and Flast set the
stage for the Data Processing decision.
The "injury in fact" portion of the Data Processing test was a new
appellation for a similar requirement under the "legal interest" ap-
proach; the "zone of interests" test, however, was a departure from
traditional standing doctrine. After Data Processing, a plaintiff
need only show that his injured interest arguably fell within the
protective ambit of a statute which lacked provision for judicial
review. Consequently, the court might largely circumvent the need
to examine the substantive merits of the case.3" The Court had
embarked upon a course calculated to expand the opportunity for a
plaintiff to have his day in court. A brief examination of the subse-
quent implementation of the Flast and Data Processing tests will
aid in assessing the impact of the Warth decision.
In an environmental action, Sierra Club v. Morton, ' 7 the Court
revealed that it would not interpret the Data Processing injury in
fact requirement restrictively. An injury of an aesthetic nature
would be sufficient, although it still must be personal to the plain-
tiff.38 The Court also showed a willingness to liberally construe sta-
tutory enforcement provisions, a policy reinforced in Trafficante v.
35. Flast only partially overruled the doctrine set forth in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923), which absolutely denied standing to federal taxpayers qua taxpayers. The
Flast doctrine granted standing when the taxpayer could point to a violation of a constitu-
tional limitation on Congress's taxing and spending power. The first amendment establish-
ment and free exercise clauses were held to constitute such a limitation.
36. 397 U.S. at 153, 158. In Data Processing, the plaintiff alleged a competitive injury
resulting from the Comptroller of Currency's decision to permit banks to provide data pro-
cessing services. The action was based on the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962 § 4, 12
U.S.C. § 1864 (1970), which provides: "No bank service corporation may engage in any
activity other than the performance of bank services for banks." The Court considered this
language in light of § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which states: "A person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1970). Standing was granted, the Court observing, "Where statutes are con-
cerned, the trend is towards enlargement of the class of people who may protest administra-
tive action." 397 U.S. at 154. Justice Brennan, concurring, would have used the "injury in
fact" test alone, since even under the "zone of interests" approach some consideration of the
merits would still be necessary. An allegation of injury in fact should be sufficient to show a
personal stake in the outcome. Id. at 172-73.
Data Processing was reaffirmed in Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971)
and Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970). See DAvis, supra note 28, at § 22.02;
Scott, supra note 28, at 663.
37. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
38. Id. at 740.
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Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.39 Following Trafficante were three
cases particularly relevant to Warth. Linda R.S. v. Richard D.40
concerned a charge that the discriminatory enforcement of a state
criminal statute was violative of an unwed mother's right to equal
protection.' The Court responded that the injury alleged must be
more than "abstract"; there must be a logical nexus between the
injury and the putatively illegal action." Standing was denied, since
in the Court's opinion a nondiscriminatory enforcement of the stat-
ute would not result in the relief the plaintiff sought . 3
Later that year the Court was again presented with an opportun-
ity to define its position on matters of causation. In something of a
sequel to Sierra Club, the plaintiffs in United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP)4 alleged per-
sonal aesthetic injuries caused by the adverse impact on the envi-
ronment which would result from the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission's increase in railroad freight rates.45 A right of action was
implied in these plaintiffs, although the statute invoked was silent
as to judicial review.4" More importantly, the Court found the causal
39. 409 U.S. 205 (1972). See notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra. The claim in Sierra
Club was grounded on § 10 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). See note 36 supra. Apparently
the Court would have been prepared to grant standing, even in the absence of a "relevant
statute," had a personal injury been alleged. For two interpretations of the intended operation
of § 10 see DAvis, supra note 28, § 22.07 and Scott, supra note 28, at 658-59.
The pertinent statute in Trafficante was the Civil Rights Act of 1968 § 810(a), 42 U.S.C. §
3610(a) (1970), which provides: "Any person who claims to have been injured by a discrimina-
tory housing practice . . . may file a complaint with the Secretary [of Housing and Urban
Development]." The Court broadly construed this provision to enable "private attorneys
general" to aid in the statute's enforcement. 409 U.S. at 211.
40. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
41. The plaintiff was the mother of an illegitimate child, and was seeking support pay-
ments from the father by prosecuting under a Texas criminal statute which imposed sanctions
for nonpayment. The statute was construed by the Texas courts as having application only
when the child involved was legitimate. Id. at 615.
42. Id. at 617-18. "[A]t least in the absence of a statute expressly conferring standing,"
the plaintiff must allege a "threatened or actual injury." Id. at 617.
43. The Court reasoned that it was speculative to assume the father would pay support
as a result of serving a jail sentence. Id. at 618. The proper party to bring the suit would be a
parent of a legitimate child who has been prosecuted under the statute. Id. at 619 n.5.
44. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
45. It was alleged that the freight rate increase would have a discouraging effect on the
use of recyclable materials, thereby causing an increased use of natural resources in the
Washington metropolitan area. The plaintiffs claimed that as a result they would suffer
aesthetic injuries since they camped, hiked and fished in this vicinity. Id. at 675-76, 678.
46. The claims were founded on a provision of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C) (1970). The ICC failed to file an environmental impact state-
ment as required by the statute. The Court deemed the plaintiffs to be persons "adversely
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relationship between the increased rates and the alleged injuries to
be sufficient, even though the line of causation was "attenuated"
and "less direct and perceptible" than that alleged in Sierra Club. 7
The third case crucial to this issue was O'Shea v. Littleton,"
decided in 1974. There, both blacks and whites claimed that racially
discriminatory practices by the local judiciary violated their civil
rights as secured by statutory and constitutional provisions." Be-
cause the plaintiffs had not recently suffered a personal injury and
were not presently threatened by the alleged practices, standing was
denied. The principle stated in Linda was held to apply in both
statutory and constitutional contexts.50 An unrelated injury was an
inadequate basis for standing, and an allegation of a threat of injury
which was at best speculative or conjectural failed as well. 51
Finally, two recent decisions closely followed the Flast "logical
nexus" test, adding the injury in fact requirement. 5 Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War13 held that neither federal
taxpayers qua taxpayers nor citizens qua citizens had standing to
challenge the constitutionality of dual membership in Congress and
the Armed Forces Reserve. 4 In United States v. Richardson," fed-
eral taxpayers were held not to have standing to challenge the fed-
eral government's refusal to permit public scrutiny of the Central
Intelligence Agency's expenditures."
affected" by agency action within the meaning of § 10 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
See note 36 supra. 412 U.S. at 685-86.
47. 412 U.S. at 688. The plaintiffs' pleadings were attacked as "vague, unsubstantiated,
and insufficient." Id. at 684. The Court responded that the defendants could have moved for
a more definite statement under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e), or used normal civil discovery devices.
412 U.S. at 689-90 n.15.
48. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
49. The first, sixth, eighth, thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, and 42 U.S.C. §§
1981-83, 1985 (1970) were invoked.
50. 414 U.S. at 493.
51. Id. at 496-97. The mere possibility that these plaintiffs might suffer an injury due to
the unconstitutional application of an otherwise constitutional statute was too remote. Id.
Cf. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972) (plaintiffs' claim that military surveillance of
civilian political activity "chilled" their first amendment rights was held to be nonjusticiable,
since no direct injury or threat of injury was alleged).
52. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 224 (1974).
53. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
54. The claim was based on the incompatibility clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, which
provides in part: "[No Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." 418 U.S. at 211.
55. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
56. The plaintiffs invoked U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, which states that "a regular Statement
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While bearing in mind Justice Douglas's caveat in Data
Processing that generalizations about standing are "largely worth-
less as such,"57 it is useful to categorize these decisions to facilitate
an understanding of Warth. Although the Flast and Data Processing
tests have been cited interchangeably, there is a dichotomy between
constitutional and statutory claims.58 Linda, Reservists and
Richardson presented constitutional claims, and the Flast test was
primarily applied. The latter two cases were unsuccessful attempts
to expand the constitutional limitations upon federal spending
power beyond the free exercise and establishment clauses. In this
type of action the requirements of Flast have been rather mechani-
cally followed. Thus the influence of Warth in this area may be
minimal, given the completeness of the Flast scheme of inquiry59
and the apparent reluctance of the Court to extend the rule of Flast
beyond the facts of that case. The potential for a more plaintiff-
oriented stance by the Court in constitutional actions not strictly
governed by Flast may not be realized.
In the realm of statutory claims the Court has used the Data
Processing test, indicating a willingness to broaden the concept of
"injury in fact" and to apply the "zone of interests" test liberally. 0
This trend invaded even the causal aspect of standing in SCRAP,
where the line of causation between the alleged injury and the ICC's
action was attenuated. There was no showing that the environment
in which the plaintiffs engaged in their activities was in fact ad-
versely affected, or that it was adversely affected as a result of the
ICC's action. Assuming that it was, no showing of personal injury
in fact was made by the plaintiffs. In contrast, the Court was not
so easily satisfied in O'Shea. A personal injury resulting from the
discriminatory action was shown, but in the Court's opinion it was
not sufficiently recent. Thus the claim failed for want of ripeness."
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from
time to time." 418 U.S. at 168. Public scrutiny of CIA expenditures was precluded by the
Central Intelligence Agency Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403j(b) (1970).
57. 397 U.S. at 151.
58. Compare Scott, supra note 28.
59. In the federal taxpayer context the Flast Court demands a "nexus between that status
and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged." 392 U.S. at 102. This
inquiry will be satisfied only when there exists a limiting constitutional provision. Id. at 102-
03.
60. Several authorities maintain the Court has ignored the "zone of interests" test. DAVIs,
supra note 28, at § 22.07; Scott, supra note 28, at 669; Sedler, supra note 29, at 511.
61. 414 U.S. at 495-97.
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O'Shea and Linda provided the immediate foundation for Warth,
for the "actionable causal relationship" test is but a more precise
statement of the principle set forth in these two cases. "2 Whether
this increased emphasis on causation is to be used, as the dissenters
felt, to limit consideration of questions which a court would prefer
to avoid will be revealed by the future application of the test. Addi-
tionally, it remains to be seen whether this shift in focus will serve
to neutralize the gains made by Data Processing and its progeny. "3
Had the Warth test been applied in SCRAP, there is a strong likeli-
hood that the outcome would have been otherwise.
It is evident from Warth that the Court will not forego an intense
examination of the standing question in order to reach the merits
of a case, regardless of their seriousness. The dissenters in O'Shea
and Warth felt the courts should be made available for attacks upon
racial discrimination whenever feasible. 4 The majority of the Court
has been unwilling to go so far. In fact, the pains taken by the Court
to reaffirm established standing principles might be interpreted as
an attempt to dispel any notions of an intention to expand the scope
of the standing doctrine.
More narrowly, what does this mean for the individual who wishes
to challenge restrictive zoning ordinances? The basic flaw in the
allegations of the low income petitioners was the absence of any
kind of property interest in Penfield. None of them were subject to
the ordinance or were denied a request for a variance. 5 Nor were
they able to point to any personal stake in the outcome of the litiga-
tion. It was this fact which enabled the Court to distinguish a group
of circuit court decisions in which the complaining parties had a
personal interest in a particular housing project; if relief were af-
forded, those parties would personally benefit. " While a present
62. Justice Brennan, however, remarked that the majority had placed "numerous hurdles,
some constructed here for the first time," in front of the petitioners. 422 U.S. at 520 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). He felt these new requirements indicated only that the Court had chosen to
close the federal courts to claims like those raised by the plaintiffs. Id. at 528.
63. Dictum in Warth may have ramifications in areas other than causation. In its discus-
sion of statutorily created rights, the Court observed that the right of action must be "ex-
pressly" stated or "clearly implied." Id. at 501. This is essentially a zone of interests inquiry,
an area which has been given liberal treatment in the past; this was particularly true when
agency action was challenged, thus bringing the plaintiff within the purview of the APA.
64. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 520
(Brennan, J., dissenting); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 509 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Sedler, supra note 29, at 500.
65. 422 U.S. at 504.
66. Id. at 507. The cases referred to were Park View Heights Corp. v. Black Jack, 467 F.2d
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contractual interest is not absolutely required, the "focus should be
on a particular project."67 In the event the individual challenging
the ordinance has neither a property interest which is adversely
affected nor a sufficient personal interest in a recently proposed
housing project, he has no other presently available avenue of at-
tack.
Viewed against the background of the standing doctrine as it has
developed since Data Processing, Warth may be seen as foreshadow-
ing a reversal of the recent plaintiff-oriented philosophy; it may also
be interpreted as a refusal to open the courts' doors any further.
With increasing attention being given to zoning patterns in subur-
ban communities and their effect upon minority residents in urban
areas who desire better living conditions, Warth shows the Court's
reluctance to break down long held notions of the right of residents
to control the development of their communities with a minimum
of outside intervention. In light of the departure of Justice Douglas,
who has long been a vigorous proponent of a liberalized standing
doctrine, the chances of a reversal in the current philosophy of the
Court appear dim.
Walter John Rackley
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE PRO-
CESS-STATE ACTION-TERMINATION OF SERVICE BY A STATE-
REGULATED PUBLIC UTILITY-The Supreme Court of the United
States has held that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's connec-
tion with the termination of service by a public utility corporation
was insufficient to make the utility's conduct attributable to the
state for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
1208 (8th Cir. 1972) (standing was granted to plaintiffs who wished to move into a specific
project in which corporate plaintiffs had made a substantial investment); Crow v. Brown, 457
F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'g 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (individual plaintiffs were
on a waiting list to move into planned low income apartments upon completion); Kennedy
Park Homes Ass'n v. Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010
(1971) (corporate plaintiffs had committed themselves contractually and federal assistance
had been approved); Dailey v. Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970), aff'g 296 F. Supp. 266
(W.D. Okla. 1969) (corporate plaintiff needed only a zoning amendment to commence con-
struction and individual plaintiff was a potential renter in that project). Cf. United Farm-
workers Housing Project, Inc. v. Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974) (once municipal
services are extended to outsiders, such extensions must be granted in a nondiscriminatory
manner).
67. 422 U.S. at 508 n.18.
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